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This chapter examines Australia’s participation in military intervention in the ‘war on 
terror’ and the role of the politics of identity. Like the Bush administration in the US, the 
Australian Government under conservative Prime Minister John Howard was 
consistently willing to suggest that the age of ‘war’ post-2001 necessitated new domestic 
ministries and agencies; new legislation (from police powers to periods of detention and 
ease of movement in and out of the country); and new forms of public participation in 
security governance. All of these were crucial components of Australia’s ‘war on terror’. 
In this chapter, however, we focus specifically on Australian interventionism in the ‘war 
on terror’: the policy and practice of involvement in military incursions beyond the 
borders of the Australian state as a means of redressing the threat posed by 
fundamentalist Islamic terrorism. We examine the reasons given for Australian 
participation in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of this ‘war on terror’, while also analysing 
Australia’s military interventionism in the immediate region, most prominently its 
mission in the Solomon Islands in 2003. We argue that understanding Australian military 
intervention in the ‘war on terror’ requires taking account of the important role of 
identity in underpinning the Government’s conception of security and providing a 
resource for the Government to justify intervention to the Australian people. 
 
Australian Foreign and Security Policy under Howard 
 
In many ways, Australia’s active participation in military interventions in the ‘war on 
terror’ was eminently predictable. Indeed the principles and commitments expressed by 
Prime Minister Howard in announcing his solidarity with and support for the United 
States after September 11, 2001, were an extension of principles and commitments 
elaborated consistently throughout Howard’s tenure as Prime Minister. A complete 
survey of Australian foreign policy imperatives and/or action prior to 2001 is not 
possible here, but two core dimensions of foreign policy are worth noting in this context: 
the centrality of a particular conception of the ‘national interest’; and the primacy 
attached to the US alliance in Australian thinking about security and its place in the 
region and the world. Both, we suggest, are intimately related to a particular conception 
of Australian national identity.  
 
On coming to power in 1996, the Howard Government was eager to distinguish its 
foreign policy style and approach from that of the previous Labor (ALP) Government 
(1983-1996) and its Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans. Evans had embraced the idea of 
‘middle power diplomacy’ and championed the notion of Australia as a ‘good 
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international citizen’.2 For Evans, this meant a commitment not simply to participate in 
multilateral fora but to attempt to develop the normative basis of international society 
and provide some form of intellectual leadership in doing so. This style of diplomacy as a 
means of advancing Australian interests was particularly evident in Australia’s role in the 
Uruguay Round of talks on the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (1986-94); post-
conflict intervention in Cambodia (1992-5); and Australia’s active role in the 
development of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. In security 
terms, the Labor Government had again emphasised the importance of strengthening the 
international institutional framework (through international leadership on nuclear 
disarmament, for example) as a means for advancing Australian security. Moreover the 
Government pointed to the need for constructive engagement with those regional 
neighbours (in particular Indonesia) who had traditionally been viewed as a source of 
threat.3  
 
The commitment to the ‘national interest’ under the subsequent Howard Government 
was beyond an attempt to demarcate foreign policy styles from that of the previous 
Government. For the Howard Government, the ALP had allowed its commitment to 
‘good international citizenship’ to move suspiciously close to a cosmopolitanism that 
rejected the ultimate primacy that governments should give the rights and needs of their 
own citizens. Both Howard and Foreign Minister Downer were of the view that under 
the ALP, the US alliance had been allowed to drift dangerously relative to a naïve 
emphasis on defence self-reliance, a dubious attempt to identify Australia as part of the 
Asian region, and a commitment to work through multilateral fora that had provided 
tangibly little for Australia. By contrast, in launching the Government’s second 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper- significantly titled Advancing the 
National Interest- Downer argued that:  
A foreign minister is chosen and paid to look after the interests of his country, 
and not to delegate for the human race. We are not about trumpeting our own 
international good citizenry simply for the sake of it. That is a trap for the 
ideologues and the naïve.4 
The Government’s willingness to work outside the rules, norms and institutions of 
international society in defence of more narrowly defined Australian interests was all too 
evident in its approach to cooperation on global climate change; its approach to asylum-
seekers and refugees; and ultimately in involvement in the ‘war on terror’.5   
 
The other key commitment in foreign policy terms under the Howard Government- one 
of course central to the content given to the ‘national interest’- was the commitment to 
the US alliance, particularly in security terms. On coming to power in 1996 the Howard 
Government immediately moved to reinvigorate the US alliance, hosting ministerial talks 
in Sydney that concluded with the so-called ‘Sydney Statement’. While accompanied by 
much fanfare, the statement amounted to little more than a reaffirmation of the central 
principles of the 1951 ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) Treaty combined 
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with new agreements on training exercises and an upgrade of US intelligence bases.6 
Even before September 11, Foreign Minister Downer argued that the US alliance was 
crucial in providing for Australian security; cementing the US into the Asia-Pacific 
region; and giving Australia more weight in both world affairs broadly and American 
foreign policy calculations specifically.7 For the Government, then, Australia could 
become a more powerful international player by tying itself closely to American foreign 
policy interests. Controversially, after leading a successful peacekeeping mission in East 
Timor, Prime Minister Howard enunciated the so-called ‘Howard Doctrine’, suggesting 
that Australia could become the US’ ‘deputy sheriff’ in the region.8 Although Howard 
subsequently backtracked from these comments- which were roundly criticised within 
the region- Australian interventionism in the Pacific after 2001 and representations of its 
regional ‘responsibilities’ suggested that the Government continued to view its role in 
this way.9  
  
The commitment to the US alliance was of course most evident in security and foreign 
policy, underpinned by the conception that Australia’s links to the US were ‘fundamental 
for our security’.10 Aside from the obvious cases under discussion here- cooperation in 
military intervention in Afghanistan and especially Iraq- it is worth noting that the 1999 
intervention in East Timor proceeded only after receiving backing from Washington; 
while in 2003 Australia committed itself to active participation in the US’ plans for 
regional missile defence. Both of these developments are significant to note given the 
negative effect they had on relations with some of the largest countries in the Asian 
region, most notably Indonesia and China. Moreover, some argue that the commitment 
to the maintenance of the alliance for Australian security even encouraged the 
Government to grant concessions to the United States in other areas of policy. This was 
a common suggestion regarding the 2004 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 
(AUSFTA), which critics argued overwhelmingly favoured American economic 
interests.11  
 
It was the extent of Australia’s commitment to the US alliance- one founded upon a 
fundamental sense of anxiety about Australian security and a narrowly defined 
conception of Australian values and the national interest- that saw Australian troops 
lining up alongside other members of the ‘coalition of the willing’ in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The Howard Government would deny that its conception of ‘maintaining’ the 
alliance equated to blind support for all elements of US foreign policy, but the notion of 
an umbilical conception of the alliance under the Howard Government was certainly a 
prominent criticism from a range of analysts of Australian foreign policy, especially after 
2001.12 The Foreign Minister’s admission in 2004 that Australia could not afford to risk 
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the alliance (and Australian security) by not participating in intervention in Iraq did little 
to undermine these accounts of Australian obsequiousness.13 While based on a narrow, 
realist conception of the national interest (in which Australia needed military protection 
in an anarchic world and dangerous regional environment), this support was also based 
on a narrow conception of Australian national identity.     
 
September 11, 2001 and Afghanistan 
 
By coincidence, John Howard was in Washington D.C. on a state visit on September 11, 
2001. From his hotel, he could see the smoke rising from the Pentagon, which he had 
visited the previous day. Although contested, a range of analysts suggest that Howard’s 
presence in the US capital profoundly impacted upon his view of 9-11,14 a point later 
acknowledged by Howard himself.15 In the days that followed, the meaning the Howard 
Government ascribed to the events and their relationship to Australia centred on three 
themes: the extraordinary nature of the attacks, which ushered in a ‘new world’; the need 
to recognise the events as an attack on the values shared by Australia and the United 
States; and the need for Australia to show solidarity with the United States.  
 
The suggestion that the September 11 attacks were extraordinary or exceptional was 
certainly not limited to the Australian Prime Minister, but his suggestion that the attacks 
ushered in a new era is significant to note. For Howard, 9-11 marked the end of a post-
Cold War innocence and the dawn of a new world: one that was ‘new and very 
dangerous’.16 This claim of exceptionality permeated subsequent Government 
justifications for a range of policy and practices in the context of the ‘war on terror’, and 
was certainly employed in justifying military intervention. The same also applies to the 
suggestion that 9/11 constituted an attack on the shared values of Australians and 
Americans. While a range of voices in democratic states expressed similar sentiments and 
offered their solidarity with the people of the US,17 Howard and the Australian 
Government suggested that these shared values underpinned cooperation in military 
intervention and indeed Australia’s broader foreign and security policy considerations. 
Howard argued that 9/11 was ‘an attack on a way of life that we in Australia share in 
common with the Americans’.18 He tied this to the idea that 9/11 suggested Australian 
vulnerability, arguing pointedly the following day that ‘Australia is not immune’ from 
terrorist attacks.19 This expression of concern- whether genuine or invoked for political 
reasons- about the potential terror threat to Australia was a central feature of the Howard 
Government’s approach to the ‘war on terror’ and security. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
‘Will the Chickenhawks come home to roost?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57:2 (2003), pp.235-
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11, the Australian-American Relationship and Attributes of Leadership’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 
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18 Howard, J., Interview with Mike Munro, A Current Affair, Network Nine, 12 September (2001). 
19 Howard, J., Press Conference, Ambassadors’ Residence, Washington DC, 12 September (2001). 
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Arguably the most striking theme of Howard’s initial response to 9-11 was the emotion 
and sadness he conveyed. While again not unusual among a range of leaders, what was 
striking here was the linkage established from sorrow to emotional and then practical 
solidarity.20 Again the day after September 11, Howard noted that   
I think it is important that countries like Australia play a role in identifying 
ourselves with the Americans. I mean, just because you are big and strong 
doesn’t mean that you can’t feel lonely and you can’t feel that your heart has been 
ripped out. And I think that is [sic] very important, therefore, that Americans 
know that they have got some really good, reliable friends.21 
He subsequently made the remarkable promise of Australian assistance to aid America ‘in 
anything they might properly do to respond’.22  
 
The promise of support from Howard was confirmed two days later. On September 14, 
the Australian Government unilaterally invoked the central treaty of the Australia-US 
alliance: the ANZUS treaty. This was a surprising move, not least as it was the first time 
since its inception in 1951 that ANZUS had been invoked, and that the original terms of 
the treaty quite clearly applied to defence issues in the Pacific Ocean. For Howard, this 
invocation was necessary to demonstrate the extent of Australian solidarity- a 
‘determination on our part to identify with the Americans’ - and to reaffirm the belief 
that the 9/11 attacks constituted acts of war, which (under ANZUS) were manifestations 
of a common threat.23 
 
The determination to assist the United States in this ‘war’ did not waver as attention 
turned to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. While the Bush Administration made the 
case that a military operation to remove the Taliban was legal and legitimate as an act of 
self-defence, the Australian Government prepared its military for action. In late 
November and early December 2001, the Government deployed 122 troops to 
Afghanistan, sending 1550 military personnel by the end of major combat operations. In 
terms of its commitment to the overall invasion (Operation Enduring Freedom) and 
occupation (International Security Assistance Force) effort, such a military presence was 
relatively limited. This suggests that Australia’s central contribution was ultimately 
towards perceptions of the intervention’s credibility or legitimacy, an argument even 
more applicable to the later intervention in and occupation of Iraq.24 
 
For the Australian Government, the ‘intellectual case’25 for Australian participation in 
Afghanistan was the necessity of a strong international response to the threat posed by a 
state leadership (the Taliban) willing to sponsor the parties responsible for 9/11: Al 
Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden. Howard was eager to establish that military means were 
necessary tools for redressing this threat. Citing the lessons of historical appeasement 
learnt from the failure at Munich (which he would do again in justifying military action 
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5 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), p.28. 
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against Iraq), Howard asserted that ‘passive indifference in the face of evil achieves 
absolutely nothing’.26 More significantly, however, Howard defined the need for 
Australian participation in Afghanistan as ‘an expression of Australia’s strong 
commitment and strong desire to share with the American people a common defence of 
things we treasure together’.27 In defining the 9/11 attacks as an attack on the values 
Australians shared with Americans, Howard suggested that Australia were compelled to 
participate in Afghanistan because Australians are ‘a people prepared to fight our own 
fights’.28 By participating in US-led intervention in Afghanistan, Australia would ‘be seen 
to have played its part’ in responding to 9-11 and defending the shared core values that 
were attacked that day.29 Over the coming years, Howard consistently suggested that 
these values were under threat in a new age of terror, even on Australia’s ‘doorstep’. 
 
Regional ‘Deputy Sheriff’ 
 
Intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq were certainly the core ‘war on terror’ interventions 
in which the Australian Government participated; but it is also important to note a series 
of smaller-scale regional interventions after 2001, particularly in the Solomon Islands in 
2003. These interventions were underpinned by the language (if not the concerns) of 
failed states providing a fertile ground for terrorist activity. And this new 
‘interventionism’ was enabled by the elaboration and enactment of similar principles by 
the United States and the broader international climate of the ‘war on terror’. Although 
Howard had certainly indicated earlier a willingness to intervene in the immediate region- 
evident in the suggestion that Australia could act as the US’ ‘regional deputy’- the context 
of the ‘war on terror’ provided particular opportunities for acting in this way. 
 
Successive Australian Governments have broadly accepted the position of regional leader 
in the South Pacific, although have long experienced difficulty reconciling a sense of 
obligation to island states in the region with accusations of acting as a hegemon in 
dealings with its smaller neighbours. Foreign Minister Downer consistently 
acknowledged this tension, noting that: 
Australia has a strong commitment and devotes substantial resources to the 
South Pacific region. It is not, however, the region’s policeman.30  
While this view continued to be elaborated until mid-2003, a precedent for a shift in 
policy was established with the 1999 intervention in East Timor. This intervention was in 
response to Indonesian Government-supported militias’ attacks on the people and towns 
of East Timor after their 1999 referendum on self-determination. The success of the 
peacekeeping intervention under Australian leadership was viewed as something of a 
vindication for the Howard Government’s willingness to take on a more prominent and 
forceful regional role. The intervention- backed by a UNSC resolution, the United States 
and ultimately (if under coercion) invited by Indonesia- was widely hailed as a success 
despite its damage to regional relations.31 As noted, intervention was followed by the 
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Howard Government’s attempt to define its regional role as that of the US’ ‘deputy 
sheriff’.  
 
After 2001, the Howard Government built on growing concerns about the need to 
ensure stability and strong governance in the Pacific by linking the threat of terrorism to 
that of ‘failed states’.32 The idea of failed states- characterised by a lack of control by 
central government over its people and territory- as a haven for terrorist activities 
became a prominent theme in the ‘war on terror’ discourse generally. The 2003 DFAT 
White Paper noted that  
South Pacific nations, particularly those weakened by internal division and poor 
governance, are vulnerable to the activities of terrorists and so are an important 
target of the Government’s assistance programs.33 
This language was especially prominent in 2003 and particularly applied to the Solomon 
Islands, which had been suffering from internal conflict and elements of lawlessness 
since 1998 that had escalated significantly in the first half of 2003. The Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)- a policy-oriented think tank- was commissioned by the 
Government to complete a report on the Solomon Islands in the same year, which 
concluded that states such as the Solomons risked becoming ‘a petrie dish in which 
transnational and non-state security threats can develop and breed’.34 Although the 
Government initially ruled out intervention (involved as they were in preparation for 
intervention in Iraq), Howard became convinced of the merits of leading an intervening 
force and hastily put one together in June-July.  
 
The intervention in the Solomon Islands- Operation Helpem Fren, or the Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)- was invited by Solomons Prime 
Minister Allan Kamekaza and its goal was to protect the Government, establish law and 
order and disarm militia groups. Commencing in July 2003, the multinational force led by 
Australia was again relatively small: initially involving 300 police supported by 1700 
military personnel. After this initial, ultimately successful phase the emphasis shifted to 
broader reconstruction and nation-building. But the significance of Australia’s Solomons 
intervention for our purposes is that it can be understood less as an attempt to address 
instability, violence and its relationship to deprivation for its own sake than as a tool for 
advancing Australian security and stability in the context of the ‘war on terror’. Greg Fry 
notes that the Government consistently invoked concerns about Australian security- tied 
to the danger of failed states and terrorism- in justifying the need for military 
intervention.35   
 
The commitment to action to preserve security on ‘our patch’ was evident in smaller 
post-2001 interventions in Papua New Guinea and Nauru, and in the Government’s 
relatively belligerent position on regional security through the Pacific Islands Forum.36 It 
was also evident in Howard’s post-Bali declaration that Australia would be willing to 
                                                 
32 On the former, see Regan and May, ‘Reassessing Australia’s Role in Papua New Guinea and the Island 
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33 DFAT, Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2003), p.38. 
34 Cited in Fry, Greg, ‘‘Our Patch’: The War on Terror and the New Interventionism’, in Fry and T. 
Kabutaulaka (eds.), Intervention and State-building in the Pacific (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2008).  
35 Ibid., see also O’Keefe, ‘Australia and fragile states in the Pacific’, pp.146-7. 
36 Fry, ‘Our Patch’; O’Keefe, ‘Australia and fragile states in the Pacific’. 
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launch a pre-emptive strike against terrorists in nearby states if there was evidence they 
were preparing an attack on. This suggestion (interpreted by neighbours in Southeast 
Asia as a veiled threat) would have been all but unthinkable before the elaboration of the 
parallel ‘Bush Doctrine’ in 2002.  
 
The ‘war on terror’ created a context in which Australia was able to pursue a more 
robust, militaristic approach to regional relations, conducted largely according to the 
Government’s own concerns about national security. Even the multinational nature of 
intervention in the Solomons belies what Michael O’Keefe has described as a form of 
‘hegemonic multilateralism’ in Australia’s own ‘coalition of the willing’.37 And as O’Keefe 
goes on to suggest, Australia’s approach to regional intervention was underpinned by a 
conception of identity that encouraged a view of the region- and ultimately of cultural 
and ethnic difference- as a potential source of threat. For Howard, such threats 
vindicated a commitment to military action where necessary and in particular a 
commitment to support for US foreign policy initiatives in a new and dangerous world. 
Of course, nowhere was the extent of this support more evident than with the Australian 
decision to participate in intervention in Iraq.   
 
Iraq  
 
In his January 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush infamously asserted that 
Iraq, Iran and North Korea formed an international ‘axis of evil’. While some reports 
suggest an early determination in elements of the administration to link 9/11 directly to 
the Saddam Hussein regime, ultimately Iraq was excluded from the initial response.38 
Nevertheless, with the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan receiving almost 
unprecedented international support, the United States saw an opportunity to pursue 
regime change in Iraq, eventually defining 2003 intervention as a central part of the ‘war 
on terror’.  
 
Throughout 2002 and in early 2003 Prime Minister Howard continued to express 
solidarity with the United States and noted Australia’s willingness to actively support the 
US in the ‘war on terror’, a position that did not change as the administration increasingly 
defined Iraq as part of that ‘war’. While not formally committing Australia to 
participation in the Iraq war until the eve of the conflict, a number of accounts suggest 
that Howard had come to a private agreement with President Bush some time in mid-
2002 that Australian troops would participate in a future intervention.39 Certainly, from 
an early stage the Government echoed the core elements of the American case for 
intervention. The initial emphasis in John Howard’s argument for strong action against 
Iraq was similar to that of other (eventual) participant states: Saddam Hussein’s failure to 
meet disarmament obligations (established under UN Security Council Resolution 687 in 
1991 and reiterated through Resolution 1441 of November 2002). This was evident in 
Foreign Minister Downer’s suggestion (on the eve of intervention) that ‘the disarmament 
of Iraq’ constituted the ‘unfinished business of the 1991 Gulf War’.40 Prior to March 
2003, however, the Australian Government suggested that responsibility for a strong 
response to the threat to international security posed by Iraq rested with the United 
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38 See Woodward, B., Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002). 
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Nations. For Howard, it was clear that Iraq was in ‘possession of agents of warfare, both 
biological and chemical, and also (had) an aspiration to develop a nuclear capacity’.41 In 
this context, the UN was compelled to adopt a strong stance regarding Iraq in the 
interests of preserving international peace and stability. Increasingly, the Australian 
Government defined this threat in the context of the broader ‘war on terror’.  
 
In October 2002, two hundred and two people, including eight-eight Australians, were 
killed in the bombing of an Indonesian nightclub on the island of Bali. Denouncing the 
bombing, and ultimately suggesting that Australian tourists were a target, Howard 
reaffirmed Australian commitment to the ‘war on terror’ and the values that underpinned 
it.  
We reaffirm again our commitment to… an Australian community bound 
together by common values of openness, individual liberty and individual 
freedom. We fight terrorism because we love freedom; we fight terrorism 
because we want to preserve the way of life that this country has; we fight 
terrorism because we share the values of other countries that are in the war 
against terrorism; and we fight terrorism because it is intrinsically evil.42 
Through notions of shared values under attack, Howard drew stark distinctions between 
the ‘indescribable savagery’ of the bombing and ‘the civilised world’.  The world leaders 
he chose to speak of when making this distinction were telling: George W. Bush, British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark and Her Majesty 
the Queen. Clearly, for Howard, the new times that 9-11 heralded were thrown into even 
starker relief after Bali. However, these new times and the new threats they posed were 
to be faced alongside Australia’s traditional allies. 
 
The following month, asserting that the Bali bombing strengthened Australia’s 
commitment to fight and defeat terrorism, Howard addressed the question, ‘why Iraq?’  
In answering, he drew upon two themes that would be used repeatedly in the run up to 
intervention. Firstly, Howard stressed, ‘Iraq has form’.43 This ‘form’ comprised of Iraq’s 
history of using WMD and supporting terrorist groups. Secondly, Howard outlined a key 
tenet of the post 9-11 mindset and the doctrine of pre-emption: the nightmare scenario 
of WMD developed by rogue states falling into the hands of terrorist groups. Although 
only a powerful additional reason for intervention in late 2002, this possibility would 
become increasingly central to folding Iraq into the ‘war on terror’, and featured 
prominently in the 2003 DFAT White Paper.44 
 
In early 2003, while the Howard Government was still suggesting it had not developed a 
position on involvement in intervention, the international debate surrounding Iraq 
intensified. Hans Blix reported on Iraqi weapons inspections to the UN Security Council 
in late January citing a lack of cooperation but no ‘smoking gun’. Howard asserted that 
the report was damning, with the few concessions that had been made achieved only 
because of pre-positioned forces, which Australia had contributed to.45   
 
From January to March, breach of UNSC resolutions remained central to the Australian 
Government’s position on the need for strong action against Iraq. Representing the 
                                                 
41 Howard, J., Address to the National Press Club, 11 September (2002). 
42 Howard, J., Address to the Parliament: Bombings in Bali, 14 October (2002). 
43 Howard, J., Address to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia, ‘Strategic Leadership 
for Australia Policy Directions in a Complex World’, Four Seasons Hotel, Sydney, 20 Nov (2002). 
44 DFAT, Advancing the National Interest, pp.xi-xii; 41-4. 
45 Howard, J., Press Conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 28 January (2003). 
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interchangeable ‘world community’, the ‘community of nations’ or ‘international 
community’, Howard like Blair pushed strongly to secure an eighteenth resolution from 
the Security Council specifically enabling intervention. As the chances of achieving the 
resolution waned, Howard began to suggest that the UN had lost some degree of 
legitimacy and credibility, and denigrated those within the UNSC (especially France) 
blocking the way of this resolution. He argued that disarmament of Iraq could not occur: 
if we continue to have spoiling tactics from, say, the French, who appear intent 
on saying no to everything irrespective of its merit.46 
 
Replacing the specific breach of UNSC resolutions, the second and third strands of 
Howard’s argument came to the fore.  Increasingly, intervention in Iraq was presented as 
both part of the ‘war on terror’ and necessary for humanitarian reasons.  The latter, 
although remaining supplementary in the run-up to intervention, would become 
increasingly significant in the war’s aftermath as it became apparent no WMD would be 
found. Howard listed numerous examples of human rights atrocities in Iraq to argue that 
human rights considerations required the pursuit of regime change.47 
 
In the lead up to intervention, integrating Iraq into the ‘war on terror’ was a more central 
and difficult task than justifying intervention with recourse to humanitarian concerns.  At 
its most explicit and succinct, Howard represented a nightmare scenario that linked Iraq 
as a rogue state to WMD proliferation and terrorism: 
If a country like Iraq is allowed to keep chemical and biological weapons, 
inevitably other rogue states will want to do the same thing. And as the number 
of rogue states possessing those weapons increases, the possibility of them falling 
into the hands of terrorist organisations multiplies.48 
The determination to link Iraq with the ‘war on terror’ was also evident in Howard’s 
controversial attempt to link the 2002 Bali bombings to intervention in Iraq: 
We lost 88 Australians in Bali because of a wilful act of international 
terrorism…and I will, amongst other things, be asking Australians to bear those 
circumstances in mind if we become involved in military conflict with Iraq.49 
 
In the more dangerous post-9/11 and post-Bali world, the Australian Government 
suggested that military intervention in Iraq was necessary so as to ‘make it less likely that 
a devastating terrorist attack will be carried out against Australia’.50 In this sense, Howard 
argued that Australia was a target for terrorists because it ‘is a Western country with 
Western values’.51 On the eve of war, intervention in Iraq was justified to secure Australia 
and protect the (Western) values of Australians as part of the ‘war on terror’. In mid-
March 2003, Australia committed 2000 Defence Force personnel to ‘Operation Iraqi 
Freedom’. While again a relatively small component of the intervening force, this 
commitment was important in adding credibility or legitimacy to the conflict itself, and in 
the face of domestic and international opposition tells us much about the Howard 
Government’s conception of Australian identity and security. 
 
Identity and Intervention: Howard’s Australia 
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As the preceding analysis suggests, representations of Australia’s history, beliefs and ‘core 
values’ were central to the processes through which military intervention became 
thinkable and to the processes through which these interventions were sold.52 Security 
itself can be seen as the definition of a group’s core values, the threats to those values 
and the means available to protect or advance them. This section outlines the Howard 
Government’s conception of Australian identity in broad terms before turning to the 
question of how specific narratives of Australian history, culture and identity were 
employed in the context of justifying military intervention as part of the ‘war on terror’.  
 
 Howard’s Australia  
 
Much has been written about John Howard’s attempt to redefine Australian identity 
while Prime Minister, much of it beginning with the observation that Howard had come 
to power suggesting that there was little need for Australia to grapple with its identity at 
all.53 What soon became clear was that Howard was rejecting the need for debate about 
Australian identity, suggesting instead that there was an essence of Australianness 
(defined in terms of mateship and founded upon sacrifice in war) of which all genuine 
Australians were intuitively aware.54 In the process, Howard not only advanced his own 
particular (narrow) conception of Australian identity but also claimed ‘the last word’ on 
the composition of that identity, limiting scope for debate about the nature of Australian 
values and their relationship to practices carried out in the name of ‘Australia’.55     
 
John Howard’s conception of Australian identity can be defined in broad terms as 
traditional, conservative and individualistic, one founded on cultural and historical ties to 
the Anglosphere (particularly Britain and the United States) and participation (and 
sacrifice) in the world wars. The latter were central to justifications for intervention in the 
‘war on terror’, with Howard emphasising the importance of being part of a Western 
community of nations and invoking the blood spilt by Australian soldiers in the world 
wars. Howard used the idea of membership of this Western community- with natural 
cultural ties to the UK and US- both as a lens through which to view the nature of 
threats in world politics and as a basis for foreign and security policy action. As noted, he 
asserted that terrorism was ‘an enemy of Australia because of who we are, not what we 
have done’,56 a claim reiterated by Foreign Minister Downer in launching Australia’s 
                                                 
52 This point builds on work in critical constructivist approaches to international relations, which are 
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Construction’, International Studies Quarterly, 37:3 (1993), pp.297-320; Weldes, J., ‘Constructing National 
Interests’, European Journal of International Relations, 2:3 (1996), pp.275-318. For discussion of the research 
questions ‘how possible’, ‘how thinkable’ and ‘how sold’ see Holland, J., ‘Coalition Foreign Policy in the 
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Presented at International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, 25-29 March (2008). 
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UP, 2004); Hage, G., Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for hope in a shrinking society (Sydney: Pluto, 2003); 
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Quarterly Essay, 19 (2005). 
54 Hage, Against Paranoid Nationalism:, chapter 5. 
55 Curran, The Power of Speech, chapter 6. 
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White Paper on the nature of the transnational terrorism threat.57 In broader terms, the 
emphasis in security policy on cultural ties to ‘great and powerful friends’- and more 
specifically the security protection required by Australia and provided by the US- was 
linked to an increasing tendency to view the immediate region as a source of threat.58 
This visceral anxiety about the region was in part founded upon a particular set of 
(realist) assumptions about world politics, but also suggests a tendency to locate threat in 
ethnic and cultural difference both within and outside Australia.59 This stood in contrast 
to the previous Government’s attempts to define Australia as a multi-cultural state that 
was part of the Asian region. 
 
Defining Australia ultimately as a ‘Western nation’ enabled Howard to explain the nature 
of threat to Australia and to justify traditionalist foreign policy as the best means to 
ensure Australian security.60 Although elaborated more frequently and forcefully in the 
period after 2001, the tendency to view foreign and security policy in terms of values 
shared with ‘great and powerful friends’ had been a core dimension of Australian foreign 
policy since 1996.61 Critics of the centrality of a narrowing ‘cultural identity’ to foreign 
policy have noted linkages to Australia’s xenophobic past. For Camilleri:  
Howard’s international conception in part reflects a deeper sense of White 
Australia’s cultural and racial identity… Howard’s conception of the world 
mirrors his image of Australia. When he speaks of Australia’s ‘national    
character’, of its ‘distinct and enduring values’, and of ‘an Australian way’, he is  
using code language to refer to key aspects of the white Anglo-Australian  
heritage.62 
 
The narrowing and exclusion at the heart of John Howard’s conception of Australian 
identity was therefore significantly tied to an interpretation of identity that emphasised 
Australia’s white, Anglo-heritage. This was given its key historical expression, for 
Howard, in the deaths of 8000 Australian soldiers at Galipolli in Turkey in 1915 on what 
became known and celebrated annually as ‘ANZAC Day’. For Howard, ANZAC Day 
commemorated the birth of Australia as a nation, while the specific battle against 
overwhelming odds illustrated the principles of ‘mateship’ that would come to provide 
the foundation for Howard’s view of Australianness.63 A range of critics have argued that 
under Howard the overwhelming primacy given to the ANZAC myth (the foundation of 
the Australian nation through brave sacrifice in blood) has dangerously narrowed 
                                                 
57 Downer, A., ‘Transnational Terrorism: the Threat to Australia’, Speech to the National Press Club, 15 
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63 See Seal, G., Inventing ANZAC: The Digger and National Mythology (Brisbane: UQ Press, 2004). 
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Australian national identity and the scope to debate Australian history or identity.64 
Indeed Mark McKenna argues that in this context  
We are witnessing the narrowing of our national mythology to one key legend 
that encapsulates our values, defines the moment of our nation’s birth and gives 
rise to a military tradition within which those values and ideals are given their 
most profound expression.65 
We would argue that Howard particularly emphasised this conception of Australian 
identity and history in the context of the ‘war on terror’, employing it to justify military 
intervention.  
 
Narratives of Identity and Interventionism 
 
Domestic support for- or at least acquiescence to- Australian interventions in the ‘war on 
terror’ was enabled through the recurrent narratives of identity and history that the 
Australian Government drew upon. Howard in particular drew upon a series of 
narratives of Australian history, culture and identity specifically in the context of 
justifying intervention. The notion of mateship was deployed to suggest a commitment 
to standing shoulder-to-shoulder with core allies, especially in battle; the idea of 
Australia’s membership in the West and shared values with the US and UK served a 
similar purpose while also suggesting the need for intervention as a form of ‘self defence’ 
of those values; while the ANZAC myth was particularly deployed to suggest the need 
for Australians to show courage and make the difficult decision to fight for the cause of 
good. These mutually reinforcing narratives- derived from a broader traditionalist 
conception of Australian identity- were central to the process through which intervention 
was justified. 
 
Mateship 
 
In a mid-2002 address on the ‘war on terror’ to a joint session of US congress, John 
Howard emphasised the importance in the Australian character of ‘mateship’, a concept 
he unsuccessfully attempted to incorporate into the preamble of the Australian 
constitution. For Howard, mateship in the context of the ‘war on terror’ meant standing 
shoulder-to-shoulder with friends, particularly in times of need. And 9/11 constituted a 
moment in which ‘mates’ needed to come forward to offer their support. Having fought 
‘side by side in every major conflict of the twentieth century’ with the US, after 9/11 
‘Australia was immediately there to help’.66 Howard suggested that Australia and the US 
were ‘able to count on each other when it has mattered most’,67 while Bush obliged in 
turn by indicating that he was ‘proud to call (Howard) my friend’.68 
 
As Gleeson has noted, emotional solidarity in the context of 9/11 shifted to (or was 
conflated with) a notion of practical solidarity in the context of the ‘war on terror’.69 The 
Australian Government built upon genuine sympathy for Americans with the tragedy of 
9/11 to make a case for Australian participation in military intervention, using the 
                                                 
64 For example, McKenna, M. ‘Patriot Act’. The Australian, 6 June (2007). Available at: 
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67 Ibid. 
68 Cited in O’Connor, B., ‘Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2003’, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, 58:2 (2004), pp.208. 
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language of ‘mateship’ in justifying this cooperation. In the immediate response to 9/11, 
Howard argued that this was ‘an occasion where we should stand shoulder-to-shoulder 
with the Americans’.70 By the time the Taliban was overthrown and the case was being 
made for intervention in Iraq, this representation was one unambiguously tied to a need 
to participate in military intervention to fight terrorism. As Howard argued, ‘you can't 
fight something like this without standing together with the Americans’.71 And even in 
the context of intervention in the South Pacific, the much-maligned suggestion that 
Australia could act as the US’ regional deputy in the region implied a level of solidarity 
with the broader fight the US was leading. This was also, of course, tied to the shared 
values being protected or advanced. 
 
Shared Values 
 
As noted, Howard and the Australian Government consistently represented the 9/11 
attacks as an attack on the ‘shared values’ of Australians and Americans, and described 
the ‘war on terror’ battle itself as one between civilisation and barbarism. Here, Howard 
invoked a particular Western, Anglo-centric narrative of Australian identity to make a 
case for participation in military intervention in the ‘war on terror’. Addressing US 
Congress in 2002, Howard argued that: 
Our pioneer past, so similar to your own, has produced a spirit that can 
overcome adversity and pursue great dreams. We’ve pursued a society of 
opportunity, fairness and hope.72 
As the case for intervention in Iraq was building, Howard also drew the United Kingdom 
more directly into representations of shared values: 
I’m a great believer that you should have close relations with the countries whose 
way of life is closest to your own. And there’s not much doubt that when you 
look around the world it is countries like the United States and the United 
Kingdom... where we identify in terms of our values far more readily.73 
Even in the case of the Solomons, Howard’s suggestion that ‘the rest of the world 
expects Australia to shoulder a lot of the burden’ positioned its role as that of taking 
‘responsibility to manage the security threat on behalf of the West’.74 
 
As noted, the definition of security and national interests in terms of values and identity 
was a feature of the 2003 DFAT White Paper, released in the weeks preceding 
intervention in Iraq. Such representations certainly reinforce the idea that Australia 
should cooperate closely with the US (and the UK), including in intervention, but also in 
the process suggests limits to levels of cooperation with those who do not share these 
values and even the possibility of viewing those ‘outside’ as threats. It is certainly possible 
to suggest that the continued attempt to identify Anglo, Western states as those with 
whom Australia identified rendered military intervention in culturally and ethnically 
different societies (such as those of the South Pacific or Middle East) more politically 
palatable. Importantly, the legitimisation of forms of racism in Australian public life since 
the arrival of Pauline Hanson in the mid-1990s ensured that this vision of ‘self’ and 
‘other’ in the ‘war on terror’ found some resonance in the broader Australian population.  
 
ANZAC 
                                                 
70 Howard, J., Press Conference, Ambassadors’ Residence, Washington DC, 12 September (2001). 
71 Howard, J., Television Interview with Ray Martin, 60 Minutes, Channel 9, 16 September (2001). 
72 Howard, J., Address to Joint Meeting of the US Congress, 12 June (2002). 
73 Howard, J., Interview with Ray Hadley, Radio 2GB, 2 October (2002). 
74 Fry, ‘Our Patch’. 
 15 
 
If mateship and shared values with Anglo-Western states were central to the Howard 
Government’s vision of Australia and its place in the world, the ANZAC myth provided 
the central historical reference point for the foundation of those values. While drawing 
together core elements of both the other narratives, particularly important here is the 
notion of Australia standing up to protect core values. Given the power of the ANZAC 
legend- even its status under Howard as a hegemonic myth of Australian identity- the 
definition of ‘war on terror’ intervention as an extension or manifestation of the ANZAC 
legend was a particularly powerful representational strategy.75 
 
The idea of reluctant but brave participation in conflict- central to the representation of 
the ANZAC myth- was prominent in justifications for intervention in Afghanistan, the 
Solomon Islands and Iraq. On the day after 9/11, Howard suggested that  
This is an occasion where everybody’s got to stand up and be counted and 
everybody who cares about the sort of life we like to take for granted and 
perhaps never should in our own country.76 
In the case of the Solomon Islands, Howard noted the need for Australia ‘to do our fair 
share of the heavy lifting’ in leading the intervening force.77 And in the case of Iraq, he 
suggested that ‘(no) Australian wants unnecessary military conflict but… we have to take 
a stand’.78 As the attempt to justify intervention in Iraq gained pace, Howard reiterated 
the claim central to the ANZAC myth: that the Australian nation was itself established 
through sacrifice in war. He suggested that: 
We are fighting now for the same values the ANZACs fought for in 1915: 
courage, valour, mateship, decency (and) a willingness as a nation to do the right 
thing, whatever the cost.79 
 
While the ANZAC legend was central to justifications for intervention, Howard’s 
commitment to this legend as the core of the Australian nation was evident a year later in 
addressing troops in Iraq on ANZAC Day in 2004:  
You are seeking to bring to the people of Iraq, who have suffered so much for so 
long, the hope of liberty and the hope of freedom, and your example, your 
behaviour, your values, belong to that great and long tradition that was forged on 
the beaches of Gallipoli in 1915.80 
 
These narratives- mateship; shared values with Western states; and the ANZAC myth- 
were of course mutually reinforcing, based on a broader traditionalist conception of 
Australian identity.  In justifying intervention in Afghanistan, the South Pacific and Iraq, 
Australia’s commitment to mateship meant standing shoulder to shoulder with those 
who shared Australian values, as Australians had done reluctantly but bravely in the face 
of evil in the previous century. This particular construction of Australian identity served 
to justify interventionism in the ‘war on terror’ and helped achieve the support or at least 
acquiescence required from the Australian people.81 However, although certainly 
dominant and underpinning the most important foreign and security policy action on 
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behalf of ‘Australia’, such a narrative and its linkage to the present did not go 
unchallenged. 
 
The War of Position 
 
If foreign and security policy is, as we would argue, a site of competing articulations of a 
group’s core values, threats to those values and the means of preserving or advancing 
them, then the Government’s articulation of Australian identity regarding intervention is 
only part of the story. What also needs to be understood is how such a narrative came to 
‘win out’ over alternatives. Of course the position and mandate of Prime Minister 
Howard and his Government is central in this regard, but so too is the capacity to 
marginalise and silence alternative accounts of Australian identity and of its relationship 
to contemporary practices (such as military intervention). A range of political parties, 
NGOs, journalists and academics directly contested different dimensions of the 
Australian Government’s involvement in the ‘war on terror’, articulating in the process 
different narratives of Australian history, culture and identity.82 But these accounts 
ultimately failed in the short-term to resonate sufficiently with the Australian population 
to precipitate major policy change or the loss of the Government’s legitimacy, 
notwithstanding majority public opposition to intervention in Iraq at the point of 
invasion.83 This failure was related to the Government’s successful framing of opponents 
as unpatriotic or unconcerned about Australian security; to the power of a broader 
discourse of post-2001 fear and insecurity; and to support for the Government’s position 
by important actors and constituencies both domestically and internationally. 
 
The willingness of the Howard Government to narrow the scope of public debate has 
already been noted in the context of Howard’s own views on public dialogue about the 
composition of Australian identity.84 In the ‘war on terror’ context, the Government was 
willing and able to position opponents of various interventions as unpatriotic and even 
‘unAustralian’. In the case of the former, those opposing intervention in Iraq, for 
example, were at times likened to appeasers of Hitler in World War II: unwilling to ‘stand 
up’ for values and key freedoms at stake, and prepared to allow a dictator’s brutal regime 
to remain in power.85 The emphasis on core and shared values generally in justifying 
intervention also arguably created a situation in which critics were less able to demur 
from the Government without questioning those values themselves. This is suggested in 
Mark McKenna’s analysis of the ways in which the ANZAC myth was employed to 
justify military intervention.86 And the suggestion of the need to ‘support our troops’ also 
invoked memories of Vietnam, when public anger with Australian participation in that 
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conflict in 1970s saw protesters target returning personnel. Here, outspoken opposition 
was positioned as disloyal to those risking their lives in theatres of war. At all of these 
levels, the Government’s representations of the need for intervention also involved 
narrowing the space for debate about intervention or the values being protected or 
advanced.   
   
The fear and anxiety that permeated the Government’s discourse of security generally -
and the ‘war on terror’ specifically- also mitigated against strong opposition to 
intervention. The Government’s continued reference to imminent terrorist threats to 
Australia posed by fundamentalist Islamic terrorists (from failed states, rogue states, 
inattentive regional neighbours, and even insufficient public concern) suggested the need 
for a ‘militarised vigilance’ in the face of the dangers of terrorism. This fear was arguably 
furthered through public information campaigns asking Australians to play their role in 
monitoring each other and readying themselves for a terrorist apocalypse;87 in constant 
references to the new and dangerous time and international context in which Australia 
found itself; and in the suggestion that Australia’s best hope for long-term survival as a 
nation was to align itself closely to its ‘great and powerful friend’: the United States. 
Control of access to official intelligence is important in this regard, especially given 
arguably disproportionate representations of the threat posed by ‘failing states’ and the 
selective use of intelligence regarding Iraq’s WMD programme in justifying intervention 
in Iraq.88  
 
Finally, the position of the Government’s conception of security and identity was also 
strengthened by the reiteration and/or support of its central claims by other key actors.  
Most directly, in the month after 9/11 the leader of the opposition- Kim Beazley- echoed 
key Governmental representations of the attacks and the nature of Australia’s obligations 
in the ‘war on terror’: 
September the 11th has changed the way we nations now think about security and 
what we have to do to defend ourselves. We have to stand shoulder to shoulder 
with George Bush and Tony Blair to root out and destroy international 
terrorism.89  
Here, core features of the Howard Government’s justification for military intervention in 
the ‘war on terror’ (membership in the West; the need to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ 
with these allies; the new and threatening post-9/11 world; and the need for a robust 
response) were reiterated by the key political alternative to the conservative Coalition in 
Australia. And when the Australian Labor Party later attempted to dissociate its approach 
with that of the Government- in arguing for the withdrawal of all troops in Iraq in the 
lead-up to the 2004 Australian election- the American Ambassador to Australia joined 
President Bush in criticising this policy. The Howard Government seized on these 
comments to suggest that a change of government would jeopardise the alliance, arguing 
that the ALP’s foreign policy reflected a ‘visceral, irrational anti-Americanism’.90  
 
Domestically, Howard’s broader identity and security project built upon the right-wing, 
nationalist and xenophobic politics of independent Member of Parliament Pauline 
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Hanson, who had come to prominence in the Australian political scene in the mid-1990s, 
claiming that Australia risked being ‘swamped by Asians’. Indeed the conception of 
security and identity so central to the Howard Government’s hard-line on asylum-seekers 
and its conception of the region as a source of threat built in important ways on the 
political agenda articulated by Hanson. These voices provided crucial ballast to the 
Australian government’s conception of security and identity, allowing the Government to 
strengthen its policy position and (further) marginalise critics. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Australia’s participation in intervention in the war on terror cannot be understood 
without attention to the role of identity. For all of the Howard Government’s initial 
attempts to suggest that Australian foreign policy would thenceforth operate on the basis 
of a hard-headed pursuit of the national interest, it has been consistently and abundantly 
clear that a particular conception of Australian identity has provided the lens through 
which the Howard Government has approached the world, and crucially a reservoir of 
resources which it has used to justify military intervention in the ‘war on terror’.91 
Howard’s conception of Australia as a white, Western country (ultimately in an alien 
regional environment) underpinned the commitment to the US alliance that was to take 
Australia from Afghanistan to Iraq and give Howard the confidence to pursue an 
interventionist foreign policy in the South Pacific (one based paradoxically on anxiety 
about the region as a source of threat). Perhaps the most telling single Government 
statement in understanding Australia’s participation in intervention in Iraq (albeit after 
one avenue for justification- the presence of a WMD programme- had become 
unsustainable) was Foreign Minister Downer’s indication in 2004 that  
 It wasn’t a time in our history to have a great and historic breach with the United  
States. If we were to walk away from the American alliance it would leave us as a 
country very vulnerable and very open, particularly given the environment we 
have with terrorism in South-East Asia, (and) the North Korean issue.92 
The world and in particular Australia’s region were dangerous; Australia needed its ‘great 
and powerful friend’ to protect it; and participation in the war in Iraq was the ‘insurance’ 
premium required for ensuring this protection.93  
 
The point we would make here is that there is nothing inevitable about this interpretation 
of the world, the region, Australian values or the nature of the US alliance. A range of 
analyses have consistently suggested that the extent of the threat posed by terrorism has 
been overstated, while others (including key bodies within Government) have concluded 
that Australia’s military interventions in the ‘war on terror’ actually makes it more likely 
that Australia will be targeted.94 Even if the idea that the region constitutes a source of 
threat is accepted, it does not follow necessarily that the use or threat of military 
intervention serves to mitigate against this threat. And it is certainly not clear that the US 
alliance- again even if accepted as necessary for Australian security- can only be 
maintained through active diplomatic and military support for all US foreign and security 
policy initiatives.  
 
Finally, Howard’s interpretation of Australian values and invocation of them to justify 
intervention must be recognised as just that: an interpretation. There is no core, timeless 
                                                 
91 DFAT, Advancing the National Interest.  
92 Cited in Allard, T., ‘Going to war secured US alliance, says Downer’. 
93 Camilleri, ‘A Leap into the Past- in the Name of the National Interest’. 
94 See McDonald, ‘Constructing Insecurity’. 
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essence of Australian identity, even while some myths (ANZAC, for example) are 
particularly sedimented and resonant in the national imagination. At different points in 
time (including under the current Labor Government) dominant narratives of Australian 
identity have emphasised multiculturalism and egalitarianism as key values of the 
Australian self, applied to reconciliation with indigenous populations, a more humane 
immigration and asylum policy and the expansion of the welfare state. In foreign policy 
terms, different Governments (again including the current Labor Government) have 
articulated the need to consider foreign policy interests from outside the straightjacket of 
the US alliance, and have suggested that Australian interests and security can best be 
advanced through constructive regional engagement and the  pursuit of ‘middle power’ 
diplomacy in an international society of states. And of course even sedimented narratives 
of identity (eg the ANZAC sacrifice as the birth of the Australian nation) can be applied 
in different ways to contemporary events, to point to the need to avoid the bloodshed of 
war wherever possible or the dangers of foreign policy tied to the interests of ‘great and 
powerful friends’.95 John Howard has not had the ‘last word’ on Australian identity, but 
coming to terms with his conception of Australian identity is crucial to making sense of 
the Government’s approach to Australian security and the processes through which 
intervention in the ‘war on terror’ became possible for Australia.  
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